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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS









On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 07-cr-00280-001)
District Judge:  Honorable Alan N. Bloch
____________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
April 23, 2009
Before:  SCIRICA, Chief Judge, SLOVITER and FISHER, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: May 4, 2009)
____________
OPINION OF THE COURT
____________
FISHER, Circuit Judge.
Wendy Watkins appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed by the District
Court, arguing that the District Court abused its discretion by ordering a fine of $1,700. 
For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm.
2I.
We write exclusively for the parties, who are familiar with the factual context and
legal history of this case.  Therefore, we will set forth only those facts necessary to our
analysis.
Watkins pleaded guilty to one count of misappropriation of postal funds, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1711.  The United States Probation Office prepared a
presentence investigation report (PSR), in which it assigned Watkins a base offense level
of 6 under § 2B1.1(a)(2) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G. or
Guidelines).  After factoring in a two-level enhancement for abusing a position of trust
under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3 and a two-level reduction for accepting responsibility under
U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a), the Probation Office calculated the total offense level as 6 which,
paired with Watkins’s criminal history category of I, resulted in a recommended
sentencing range under the Guidelines of zero to six months of imprisonment, making
Watkins eligible for probation.
The Probation Office also indicated in the PSR that the Guidelines called for the
imposition of a fine between $500 and $5,000.  See U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2(c)(3).  But the
Probation Office reported that Watkins earned $435 per month from a part-time job and
that her husband earned a monthly salary of $1,950 and, after taking into account the
couples’ living expenses, concluded that Watkins apparently did not have the ability to
pay a fine within the recommended Guidelines range.
3Watkins argued that the abuse-of-trust enhancement was inapplicable and the
District Court, in its tentative findings and rulings, agreed with Watkins and therefore
reduced the total offense level to 4.  While the recommended Guidelines range remained
zero to six months of imprisonment, this modification to the base offense level reduced
the recommended fine range to $250 to $5,000 under U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2(c)(3), and the
District Court indicated in its tentative findings and rulings that Watkins was “subject to a
fine” within that range, “subject to her ability to pay.”  The District Court also tentatively
ruled that Watkins was subject to pay restitution.
At the sentencing hearing, the District Court adopted its tentative findings and
rulings and sentenced Watkins to two years of probation and ordered her, inter alia, to pay
a within-Guidelines fine of $1,700 in monthly installments of $100.  The District Court
indicated that Watkins should begin to make the payments once restitution was satisfied,
but noted that, given Watkins’s financial situation, she was not required to pay interest on
the fine.  Watkins’s counsel objected, pointing out that the Probation Office indicated in
the PSR that Watkins did not have the ability to pay a fine.  The District Court disagreed,
explaining that based on Watkins’s part-time job earnings of approximately $400 per
month, she had the ability to make the $100 monthly payments.
Watkins timely appealed from the judgment of sentence, challenging only the
District Court’s decision to impose a fine.
4II.
The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231 and we have
jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3742 and 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review the reasonableness
of a district court’s sentence under an abuse-of-discretion standard.  United States v.
Kennedy, 554 F.3d 415, 418 (3d Cir. 2009).  Our review is plenary with respect to the
legal sufficiency of a district court’s factual findings concerning a defendant’s ability to
pay a fine and, where those findings are legally sufficient, we review the district court’s
factual determination whether the defendant has the ability to pay a fine for clear error. 
United States v. Kadonsky, 242 F.3d 516, 518 (3d Cir. 2001); cf. United States v. Grier,
475 F.3d 556, 570 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc) (stating that we will “review factual findings
relevant to the Guidelines for clear error”).
III.
Watkins contends on appeal that the $1,700 fine is unreasonable and that the
District Court abused its discretion by ordering her to pay it.  Specifically, she asserts that
after she objected to the fine and referenced the PSR in support of her argument at the
sentencing hearing, the District Court was required to make findings regarding her ability
to pay the fine, but failed to do so.  She also argues that the District Court “misapplied”
several of the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), including her history and
characteristics, the nature and circumstances of her offense, and the kinds of sentences
available.  Having reviewed the record, we disagree.
5The Guidelines advise a district court to “impose a fine in all cases, except where
the defendant establishes that he [or she] is unable to pay and is not likely to become able
to pay any fine.”  U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2(a).  A defendant seeking to avoid paying a fine “has
the burden of coming forward with evidence from which the [district court] could find it
more likely than not that any fine would remain unpaid.”  Kadonsky, 242 F.3d at 520. 
Once the defendant puts forth such evidence, the district court “may not impose a fine
without making findings concerning the defendant’s ability to pay it.”  Id.  “The burden of
persuasion is on the defendant to show that an inability to pay will be more likely than
not.”  Id.; accord United States v. Torres, 209 F.3d 308, 312 (3d Cir. 2000) (“The
defendant has the burden of proving his or her inability to pay.”).  In determining whether
to impose a fine, as well as the amount and payment method of any fine, a district court is
to consider various factors in addition to those listed in § 3553(a), including the
defendant’s financial situation and earning capacity, the burden of the fine on the
defendant and other dependents relative to alternative punishments, any pecuniary loss
caused by the offense, any restitution due, and the expected governmental costs of the
sentence.  18 U.S.C. § 3572(a); U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2(d); see Torres, 209 F.3d at 313 (stating
that the “sentencing court must consider an array of factors” under U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2(d)
and 18 U.S.C. §§ 3572(a) and 3553(a)).
The Government acknowledges that because Watkins referenced the PSR in
support of her argument, the District Court was obligated to make factual findings as to
6her ability to pay.  See Kadonsky, 242 F.3d at 520 (“The defendant may meet that burden
[of coming forward with evidence] by an independent showing or by reference to the
PSR.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  The Government argues, however, that the
District Court did in fact make adequate factual findings and, accordingly, did not clearly
err in determining that Watkins failed to satisfy her burden of showing an inability to
make monthly installment payments of $100.
We agree with the Government.  It is well-established that a district court need not
make findings regarding every factor involved in its sentencing decision so long as the
record is sufficient to show the district court took the relevant factors into account.  See
United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 329 (3d Cir. 2006).  Indeed, where a district court
creates “enough of a factual record that it is clear that it considered a defendant’s ability
to pay [a fine], its findings may be deemed adequate.”  United States v. Seale, 20 F.3d
1279, 1284 (3d Cir. 1994); see also United States v. Orlando, 553 F.3d 1235, 1240 (9th
Cir. 2009) (stating that a district court, in deciding whether to impose a fine, is not
required to state every factor under §§ 3553(a) and 3572(a)); Torres, 209 F.3d at 313
(stating that the district court must create a factual record “such that it can be said that the
[district court] considered the issue” of a defendant’s ability to pay a fine).
Contrary to Watkins’s assertion, the record here demonstrates that the District
Court, after considering her financial situation, made adequate factual findings and
decided in its discretion that she was capable of paying the within-Guidelines fine by
7means of the fashioned installment plan.  Specifically, the District Court stated that it
considered the § 3553(a) factors and, in response to Watkins’s objection to the fine, found
that she had the ability to pay the fine by monthly installments of $100, waiving any
interest on that fine.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3572(d)(1) (stating that where a court orders a fine,
payment must be made immediately “unless, in the interest of justice, the court provides
for payment on a date certain or in installments”).  It confirmed that she earned
approximately $400 per month at her part-time job and found that she was capable of
contributing a portion of that income toward satisfying the within-Guidelines fine.  See
Seale, 20 F.3d at 1284 (concluding that a district court may rely on a defendant’s future
earning capacity in considering whether a fine is appropriate); see also § 3572(a)(1)
(stating that a court is to consider the “defendant’s income, earning capacity, and
financial resources” in determining whether to impose a fine); U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2(d)(2)
(directing the court to consider a “defendant’s ability to pay the fine (including the ability
to pay over a period of time) in light of his [or her] earning capacity and financial
resources”).
The District Court also determined that Watkins would be able to pay exclusively
from her own earnings and ultimately determined that a fine was justified here given her
offense and the governmental costs.  See § 3572(a)(2), (a)(6) (stating that a court is to
consider the factors under § 3553(a), including the nature of the offense, and “the
expected costs to the government” as well as the burden on “any person who is financially
8dependent on the defendant”); U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2(d)(1), (d)(3), (d)(7) (same).  Moreover,
in imposing the sentence, it made findings regarding the restitution owed and waived any
interest on the restitution after taking into account Watkins’s financial condition.  See
§ 3572(a)(4) (stating that a court is to consider “whether restitution is ordered or made
and the amount of such restitution”); U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2(d)(4) (same).  And while we
acknowledge Watkins’s financial difficulties, we cannot say that the District Court’s
factual findings as to her ability to pay a no-interest fine on this installment plan were
clearly erroneous under the circumstances of this case.
We also reject Watkins’s argument that the District Court “misapplied” several of
the § 3553(a) factors.  Watkins’s within-Guidelines sentence, which involved a term of
probation along with the fine, readily “falls within the broad range of possible sentences
that can be considered reasonable in light of the § 3553(a) factors.”  United States v.
Wise, 515 F.3d 207, 218 (3d Cir. 2008).
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment of
sentence.
